

Statement by the Honorable Kenneth L. Adelman
Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
February 20, 1985

In January 1984, at the request of the United States Congress, President Reagan submitted a report on seven violations or probable violations of arms control obligations or related political commitments by the Soviet Union. In the first week of February 1985, a follow-up report was submitted to Congress which reconfirmed our conclusions of last year and in some cases strengthened them. It also dealt with a number of additional critical problems with existing commitments.

The majority of the problems presented by Soviet noncompliance are related to bilateral undertakings--particularly, the SALT I and SALT II agreements, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Other cases deal with very important multilateral treaties including the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Helsinki Final Act, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol as reflected in international law.

Our review of compliance issues this year and last year has been a long and careful process involving all interested agencies and a close review by the President himself.

The unclassified reports cover those areas where questions of Soviet compliance have been raised with the Soviet Union.

The conclusions of these two unclassified reports come as no surprise to the Soviet Union. The U.S. Government has repeatedly raised these issues with the Soviet Union, including at the recent Geneva talks between Secretary Shultz and Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko.

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question the benefits of arms control and could create new security risks. Noncompliance undermines the whole arms control process. To be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance.

The Soviets have not provided satisfactory explanations or undertaken corrective actions sufficient to alleviate our concerns, but we will continue to press these issues with them. The Administration will also continue to work closely with the Congress in seeking to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

I believe that this trend in Soviet behavior can and must be reversed. We can restore our purpose by new and effectively verifiable agreements and also by continuing to work on these unresolved arms control problems.

As all of you know, the Reagan Administration is strongly committed to arms control, to strengthening its contribution to our national security, and to reducing nuclear weapons. A recent agreement with the Soviets to start the new negotiations illustrates this commitment. Effective verification and compliance are critical components.

I am frequently asked why we try to negotiate new agreements with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union is violating existing agreements. We do this for several reasons. First, new arms control agreements, if soundly formulated and fully adhered to, can serve U.S. security interests. We should not abandon efforts to achieve effective and verifiable agreements that can increase U.S. and allied security and reduce the risk of war.

Second, entering new negotiations does not in any way condone or ignore past Soviet behavior. Finally, continuing to negotiate can give us another channel for trying to get the Soviets to abide by existing agreements.

How can we effectively pursue fresh arms control initiatives? I would be the first to caution, in this regard, that progress should not be measured by the number of words committed to paper. Rather, progress needs to be measured by meaningful and effective arms control agreements. We can accomplish this if we approach the task with realism and with perseverance.

We must set realistic objectives. We should, first, identify those security concerns of highest priority which can be addressed.

This we have done and we are ready to begin negotiations in Geneva in March on Strategic Weapons, Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, and Defense and Space. We will also make our current concerns about Soviet violations an integral part in the relevant discussions.

In addition, we are realistic in our expectations. Perfect verification will not--cannot--be achieved. We will consult with the Congress on any verification shortfalls as well as on the military risks which would be posed by potentially undetectable cheating. We may find that that verification difficulties can be reduced to some extent with the procurement and deployment of additional and/or new national technical means. We may find that the military risks of potentially undetected cheating can be reduced through enhancements to the funding of military programs.

This Administration is committed to providing the Congress with a clear and honest assessment of any verification deficiency, and its attendant military risks, so that the Congress can participate in the determination of whether the Treaty will indeed serve the overall interests of the United States and its Allies.

But as the Soviet record demonstrates, this is not enough to ensure that a treaty or some of its provisions are sufficiently verifiable. While our studies of Soviet compliance have uncovered areas where past treaties are not effectively verifiable, we have also been able to conclude with confidence that the Soviets have violated some of their arms control obligations. In some cases, their cheating has been blatant. The Krasnoyarsk radar is too big to be hidden and its purpose and its location make it a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. The encryption of Soviet missile test telemetry could not be a more obvious violation of the Soviet political commitment to abide by the provisions of SALT II. The Soviets have, by their actions, shown that they will violate arms control treaties.

Accordingly, we must demonstrate to them that no advantage will accrue to them from violations. To date, our funded military programs have been sufficient to deny them any lasting advantage;

if our requests for full funding of the strategic modernization program are fulfilled we may be able to make the same statement in the future.

While our security has not yet suffered because of Soviet noncompliance, the arms control process does suffer. We cannot accept such behavior if arms control is to contribute to world security and stability.

In the upcoming Geneva talks we will have ample opportunity to drive home our message that compliance with existing agreements is a prerequisite for future agreements. We will be all the more effective if it is clear that the Congress joins us in our concern and condemnation of Soviet violations. We also hope that other nations of the world will join us by expressing their concern about Soviet behavior.

In my address to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva last week, I was pleased to present a message from the President stating his commitment to arms control. I also placed into the record of the CD the President's unclassified Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. I further noted the apparent cessation of chemical weapons use in 1983 and 1984 -- if our information is correct -- by the Soviets

and their surrogates in Afghanistan, Laos and Cambodia. This followed the strong concern expressed by the international community about earlier Soviet behavior. If there is cause and effect, and we can hope there is, it was forthright exposure of the violations by the United States and the outcry of people everywhere which influenced Soviet behavior.

The international community can also play a role in modifying Soviet behavior if they join with us in decrying Soviet violations. If the United States, its Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, and its citizens take Soviet compliance seriously, and if the international community joins us, we can hope that Soviet behavior will change and arms control can once again offer the world the hope of real security.